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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RUPP, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-v-
GRANTSVILLE CITY, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16270 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants brought an action for declaratory in-
junctive relief enjoining the enforcement of certain provisions 
of the respondents' ordinance entitled "Sewers," which provi-
sions are cited as Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34, and 35 of the 
Grantsville City Ordinances, as revised, and from enjoining 
the enforcement of certain provisions of the respondents' ordi-
nance entitled "Water," which provisions are cited as Chapter 
28, Sections 13, 15, and 27 of the Grantsville City Ordinances, 
as revised. 
The appellants contend the respondents were without 
necessary statutory authority to enact certain of these 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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sections and that in other aspects the sections are unconstitu-
tional in violation of notice and hearing requirements of due 
process. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of this matter was before the Third Judi-
cial District Court of Tooele County, the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., Judge, presiding. 
At the close of evidence and argument, the lower court 
granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT OH APPEAL 
The appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court by having th1s court construe and restrain the sec-
tions of the ordinances and their enforcement as being unconsti-
tutional and unauthorized by statutes of the State of Utah 
insofar as the sections of the ordinances purport to extend to 
the respondents' powers which have not been granted them by the 
legislature. 
STATEUENT OF FACTS 
In conjunction with an earlier ordinance relative to 
a sewer system, which did not require mandatory hookups, in 
1967 the respondents held a special election which failed to 
give the respondents the authority to issue general obligation 
bonds for the construction of a sewer system. 
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In 1969 the respondents began prodecures for a 
second special election to give the respondents the authority 
to issue general obligation bonds for the construction of a 
sewer system. 
In an attempt to gain public approval through this 
second special election, the respondents authorized the print-
ing of pamphlets to inform the public that they now had coIImlit-
ments for financial grants from the gederal government (Housing 
and Urban Development - $198,000; Federal Water Quality Agency -
$67,000). 
In these pamphlets the respondents informed the 
appellants and others of the general public that the charge to 
connect would be $250 and that those not connected would not 
be charged, i.e., " ... tho~e people using the system and re-
ceiving benefits from it to pay for the construction." 
The appellants and others had adequate septic tanks 
and did not desire to connect. 
The respondents discovered that to obtain the federal 
grants they had to revise their sewer ordinance to provide for 
mandatory hookups. 
The ordinance being attacked in this case was amended 
in 1969 to provide for mandatory hookups, at which time no such 
statutory authority existed. It was not until 1971 that the 
legislature granted the respondents and other cities the statu-
tory authority for mandatory hookups. 
-3-
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After the second special election following the rep-
resentations in the pamphlet, the respondents let the contract 
for the construction of a sewer system. Later it was dis-
covered the contractor had made a $150,000 mistake in his esti-
mate and contract price. Rather than bringing suit against 
the contractor, the respondents waived that right and decided 
to increase the connection fee from $250 to $350. This action 
was done after a public hearing before the respondents but not 
by a vote by the people. 
Thereafter, the respondents sent notices to the 
appellants and others to the effect that it was mandatory that 
they hook up to the sewer system and pay the increased connec-
tion fee plus monthly rates, or they would have all of the 
water being used by them cut off as a means to effect enforce-
ment of their mandatory hookup ordinance. 
The appellants had their water turned off for re-
fusal. They were advised by counsel to pay under protest so 
that they would not be deprived of water and then to determine 
if this action should be brought, which it was and is now be-
fore this court on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS HAD NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
TO ENACT THE ORDINArlCE FOR HANDATORY HOOK-
UPS TO THE SEWER SYSTEM. 
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The respondent is a city. And cities are in their 
nature and purpose creatures, instrumentalities, or local 
agents of the state to exist, function, or be annihilated 
strictly at the will of the legislature for the convenient ad-
ministration of government throughout the state. 
Cities may exercise only those powers which have 
been expressly granted by the legislature by general laws; 
those powers which are reasonably implied as being necessary 
to carry out those powers which have been expressly granted; 
and those powers which are essential to the declared objects 
and purposes of all cities alike created, not merely conveni-
ent, but absolutely indispensable. (16 C.J.S. Const. Law 
§ 140(b); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. §§ 107 and llO(b); 37 Am. Jur. 
722; lMcQuillin, Mun. Corps. 387 (2ded.); lDillon, Mun. 
Corps. § 237 at 448 (5th ed.); Utah Const. art. IX, § 5; 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1953); Rich v. Salt Lake City, 20 
Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 690 (1968); Salt Lake City v. Allred, 
19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. 2d 3 71 (1967) ; al though reversed on re-
hearing on point of preemption, Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 
Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), wherein the cases of Kusse, 
Leo, Charlier, Hoffman, Horne, and Doran, infra, were cited 
with approval; Salt Lake City v. State Tax Cormn'n, 11 Utah 2d 
359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah 
2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957); Ritholz v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 
2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952); Nance v, Mavflower Tavern, 106 Utah 
517, 150 P.2d 777 (1944); Duchesne County v, State Tax Comm'n, 
104 Utah 635, 140 P.2d 335 (1943); Walton v. Tracy Loan and 
Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); Riggins v. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935); 
American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62 P.2d 557 
(1936); Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 
P.2d 1 (1936); although reversed on other grounds by Rich v. 
Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 690 (1968); Lehi City 
v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); Wadsworth v. Santa-
quin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); Salt Lake City v. 
Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 15 P.2d 648 (1932); Bohn v. 
Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.L.R. 215 (1932); 
Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P. 2d 510 (1931); Ameri-
can Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930); Salt 
Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923); Salt Lake 
City v. Bernhagen, 56 Utah 159, 189 P. 583 (1920); Ogden City 
v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530 (1919); Salt Lake Citv v. Board 
of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654 (1918); 
Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 P. 1057 (1918); Tooele v. 
Hoffman, 42 Utah 596, 134 P. 558 (1913); Salt Lake County v. 
Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 P. 560 (1913); American Fork v. 
Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 P. 739 (1913); Salt Lake City v. 
Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 P. 636 (1913); Pleasant Grove City v. 
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Lindsay, 41 Utah 154, 125 P. 389 (1912); Salt Lake City v. 
Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705 (1910), Ann. Cas. 1912C 189; 
Ifolden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am. S. R. 917 
(1899); Ogden City v. Boseman, 20 Utah 98, 57 P. 843 (1899); 
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A. 
628 (1899); Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 P. 985 
(1898); Ogden City v. Bear Lake and River, etc., Co., 16 Utah 
440, 52 P. 697, 41 L.R.A. 305 (1898).) 
This view is well expressed in 1 Dillon, Municipal 
Coroorations 154 (5th ed.): 
It must now be conceded that the 
great weight of authority denies 
in toto the existence, in the ab-
sence of special constitutional 
provisions, df any inherent right 
of local self-government, which is 
beyond legislative control. The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
has declared that a municipal cor-
poration in the exercise of all 
its duties, including those most 
strictly local or internal, is but 
a department of the State. The 
legislature may give it all the 
powers such a being is capable of 
receiving, making it a miniature 
State within its locality; or it 
may strip it of every power, leav-
ing it a corporation in name only; 
and it may create and recreate 
these changes as often as it chooses, 
or it may itself exercise directly 
within the locality any and all 
powers usually committed to a muni-
cipality. So viewed its acts cannot 
be regarded as sometimes those of 
an agency of the State and at others 
those of a municipality; but, its 
-7-
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character and nature remaining at 
all times the same, it is great 
or small according as the legisla-
ture shall extend or contract the 
sphere of its actions. 
The respondents in this case now on appeal have 
never yet contended the law in this state to be contrary to 
that which has been stated above. In fact, the respondents 
rely solely on Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) for their auth-
ority to enact the 1969 mandatory hookup ordinance, when such 
express statutory authority was not given the respondents or 
any city until the 1971 amendment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 
(1953) . 
The respondents do not rely on their so-called gen-
eral welfare powers which are to be found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-84 (1953). Nor could there be reliance thereon, because 
that statute merely authorizes cities to pass "all ordinances 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers 
and duties conferred by this chapter .... " (Emphasis added.) 
The general grant of power to enact ordinances to be 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1953) is merely in aid of 
the special grants of express powers elsewhere to be found in 
the legislative statutes called general laws which are required 
to have uniform application throughout the state (American 
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930)) and 
does not enlarge or annul any special grant of express power. 
-8-
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(Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.L.R. 
215 (1932).) 
Therefore, the respondents were without statutory 
authority to enact the mandatory hookup ordinance under attack 
in this appeal, because such ordinance was enacted in 1969, 
two years prior to the 1971 statutory authority. And inter-
estingly enough, the respondents to this very day have not yet 
enacted a valid mandatory hookup ordinance even though they 
have had such authority since 1971. 
The appellants do not contend the respondents were 
without authority to construct, maintain, and operate a city 
sewer system. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) since its incep-
tion in 1898 has provided such authority. 
What the appellants do contend is that the respon-
dents by the ordinance relied on do not have the authority to 
compel the appellants to hook up to the sewer. 
The appellants recognize and accept the burden of 
establishing the invalidity of the ordinance under attack. 
(Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).) This 
burden is met through two parallel lines of reason. 
First, the general construction of doubtful city 
authority, both within this state and others, is that where 
there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a par-
ticular authority of a city, that doubt should be resolved 
against the city, and the authority should be denied. (Nance 
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v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944); Pacific 
County v. Sherwood Pacific, Inc., 567 P.2d 642 (Wash. App. 
1977); Salinas v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 72 Cal. 
App. 2d 494, 164 P.2d 905 (1946); Fullerton v. Central Lincoln 
People's Utility District, 185 Ore. 28, 201 P.2d 524 (1948).) 
Secondly, there would be no need for the legislature 
to amend Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) in 1971, expressly 
granting the authority to cities for mandatory hookups if that 
authority were already implicit in the pre-amendment version of 
the statute. 
Thus, the very fact the legislature in 1971 amended 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) supplies the necessary consen-
sus that the pre-amendment version authority for mandatory 
hookups was sorely in doubt at best and more likely was inten-
tionally and entirely lacking. 
Hence, following the general constructions of doubt-
ful city authority and the need for express statutory authority, 
the authority for mandatory hookups the respondents claim by 
the 1969 ordinance should be denied. 
Furthermore, another well-established rule of con-
struction is that, in the absence of any express statutory 
provision to the contrary, the enumeration of some express 
authority within a statute (e.g., to provide for a sewer system 
prior to 1971) implies the exclusion of all other authority 
within that statute (e.g., no mandatory hookups until after 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the 1971 amendment). (62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations§ 120; 
City of Tulsa, Okla. v. Midland Valley R.R., C.C.A. Okla., 
168 F.2d 252; Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. S32, S6 N.E. 
2d 79S; City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 4S N.E. 
2d 8S2, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 7S6, 63 S. Ct. 117S, 87 L. Ed. 
1709; Van Eaton v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 47S, 
71 A.L.R. 820, 43 C.J. 197, n. 19.) 
Also, where there is the enactment of subsequent legis-
lation containing a specific grant of authority (1971 mandatory 
hookup amendment) which authority is kindred to that contained 
in prior legislation (sewer system), the prior legislation con-
taining a general grant of authority usually suggests the con-
clusion that the subsequent specific grant of authority was 
not in the prior legislation. (Salt Lake City v. Towne House 
Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967).) 
And preference should be given subsequent statutes 
over prior statutes where there is a conflict. (Nelden v. 
Clark, 20 Utah 382, S9 P.2d S24; Pacific International Express 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549.) 
Finally, where statutes are conflicting, the more 
specific takes precedence over the general (Rammell v. Smith, 
S60 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); University of Utah v. Richards, 
20 Utah 4S7, S9 P. 96; 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 2S7; State v. 
Rice 110 Ariz. 210, Sl6 P.2d 1222 (1973); In re Smart, S4 __ , 
Haw. 2SO, SOS P.2d 1179 (1973).) 
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In conclusion, it must be conceded the respondents 
through the 1969 ordinance did not have authority for mandatory 
hookups to the city sewer system, because the legislature never 
provided that authority until its 1971 amendment of Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953). 
Therefore, the appellants were wrongfully compelled 
to hook up to the sewer system, pay connection fees and monthly 
fees or have their water services discontinued. The appellants 
should be able to again use their septic tanks if so desired 
and receive refunds of all fees heretofore paid by virtue of the 
invalid 1969 mandatory hookup ordinance and other ordinances 
related thereto. And all of this whether or not such fees were 
paid under protest, because the ordinances under which the fees 
were paid were and still are invalid. (Wilson v. Heber County, 
111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941).) 
POINT II 
THE BOND ELECTION WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE 
RESPONDENTS INDUCED THE APPELLAi."iTS BY 
MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
Of course, if this court finds the ordinances dis-
cussed in Point I of this brief are without authority, then the 
respondents cannot compel the appellants to pay fees of any 
amounts pertaining to mandatory hookups. 
This point, though brief, goes further and contends 
the appellants need not pay any connection fees because the 
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pamphlets stated the charge to connect would be $250 and that 
those who did not connect would not be charged. 
The appellants chose not to connect but were not 
only compelled to hook up but were charged $350 rather than 
the $250 represented as being the fee to connect. 
The case of Utah Savings and Trust v. Salt Lake City, 
99 P. 255 (Utah 1908) stands for the proposition that if erro-
neous statements were made with respect to the bond election, 
and the plaintiffs can make a showing that they and others were 
induced by reason of such improper statements to vote for the 
bonds, then the validity of the election can be examined by 
the courts. 
The case most on point with the instant case is 
Ricker v. Board of Educ .. of Millard County School District, 
396 P.2d 416 (Utah 1964). There this court examined the 
effect of the "explanatory brochure" concerning a school bond 
election and the misleading statements contained therein. 
Since this court found no deceit, fraud, or corruption on the 
part of the school board, it held against the plaintiffs. 
The appellants in the instant case, however, contend 
the pamphlet contained the misrepresentations stated and made 
the bond election invalid and unconstitutional for lack of due 
process and fair opuortunity to vote. (U.S. Const. amends. V 
and XIV.) 
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POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS HAVE BEEN DENIED EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAW IN THAT THE RESPONDENTS 
HAVE NOT APPLIED THE ORDINA.c~CES TO ALL IN 
LIKE SITUATIONS. 
The appellants have been compelled to hook up to the 
sewer system and pay fees while the respondents have not even 
done so themselves as to all properties owned by the respon-
dents, and without having others within the city do so, where 
the sewer could be but has not been constructed because of 
costs, and not inaccessibility, all of which constitutes select 
law enforcement, amounting to the denial of constitutional 
equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const. amend. XIV.) 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN 
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS WHERE THEY 
PROVIDE FOR WATER TERMINATION WITHOUT 
HEARINGS. 
Assuming without admitting that Revised Grantsville 
City Ordinances, Section 22-31 (R.G.O. § 22-31), the mandatory 
hookup ordinance enacted in 1969, although the legislature 
never expressly authorized same until 1971, is deemed by this 
court to be valid, the appellants still contend Revised 
Grantsville City Ordinances, Section 28-27 (R.G.O. § 28-27), 
the water termination ordinance, is still unconstitutional in 
that it fails to provide for prior hearings as required by due 
process of law. 
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The second paragraph of R.G.O. § 28-27 begins by 
stating, "Persons applying for connection The appellants 
never applied for connection because they resisted the manda-
tory hookup provision of R.G.O. § 22-31. 
The last paragraph of R.G.O. § 28-27 provides: 
If any part of the account for 
either sewer or water becomes 
delinquent, as in this Code pro-
vided, the water service shall 
be discontinued by the City 
until all delinquencies have 
been paid in full including the 
reconnection fee. 
The appellants had their water turned off because 
they refused to pay the mandatory hookup fee and the monthly 
sewer fees thereafter. The .respondents sent letters of demand 
for such payments but held no hearings before terminating all 
water services to the appellants. 
The respondents refused to reconnect water services 
to the appellants until satisfactory arrangements for payment 
had been made. It was because of this the appellants were ad-
vised by counsel to pay such fees under protest so that their 
water services would be resumed until this matter could be de-
cided through the courts. 
A recent case directly in point with the instant case 
is Koger v. Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375 (D.C. Pa. 1976). In 
that case a class action for declaratory injunctive relief was 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
brought, contending that certain termination procedures of the 
city water department violated the due process clause of amend-
ment XIV of the United States Constitution. 
The district court there found at p. 1386: 
. . . a water user has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to continued 
water services which is a property 
interest to which the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies. 
Having determined that due process applies, the court 
then addressed the question as to whether the procedures 
adopted by the defendant water department in connection with 
the termination of water services were in compliance with the 
requirements of the due process clause. The court noted that 
the fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
(At p. 1387.) Since the ordinances under which the defendant 
water department was acting did not require a hearing prior to 
termination of water services, the court concluded at p. 1388: 
the pre-termination procedures 
employed by the defendants are in-
adequate to satisfy the requirements 
of the due process clause. 
And the court further concluded at p. 1389: 
Due process requires a hearing prior 
to the termination of essential 
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services such as water and sewer 
and making payment of all de-
linquent water and sewer bills 
a condition precedent to a hear-
ing is not sufficient. 
Therefore, since in the instant case, neither R.G.O. 
§§ 22-31 nor 28-27 require a hearing prior to the termination 
of water and sewer services, both ordinances are unconstitu-
tional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 
The distinction of a class action suit is of no sig-
nificance, because if the ordinances are unconstitutional or 
otherwise without authority, they are invalid, unenforceable, 
and no vehicles through which fees may be collected lawfully. 
Any such fees collected must be refunded whether or not paid 
under protest. (Wilson v. Weber Co., 111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941).) 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court should be reversed 
with a declaratory judgment by this court that the respondents 
acted without authority through their ordinances of mandatory 
hookups (R.G.O. § 22-31) and water termination (R.G.O. § 28-27), 
because of the absence of express legislative authority and 
in violation of constitutional due process. 
Furthermore, this court should order the respondents 
to refund all unlawfully collected fees and permanently enjoin 
the enforcement of both ordinances and any others which flow 
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therefrom for their provisions which are in conflict with 
statutory and constitutional requirements stated herein. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAJ.'1SEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the fore.going 
brief of appellants were mailed to Edward A. Watson, Tooele 
County Attorney, Tooele County Courthouse, Tooele, Utah 84074, 
this s±:t. day of June, 1979. 
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